And this seems to be the view of the case commended not only by
constitutional and parliamentary practice, but by common-sense. It would
be strange, indeed, when the questions submitted to the British
Parliament and the decisions of that Parliament on them are so often of
paramount importance to the whole world, if the Parliament should be the
only body in the world denied the right of revising its own judgments,
the only one whose first resolution is so irrevocable that even itself
may not change or modify it. To rescind a recent vote is, no doubt, as
Sir Robert Peel said, a step not wholly free from objection. It should
be an exceptional act, as one which, if often repeated, would give an
appearance of capricious fickleness and instability to the opinions of
Parliament, calculated to impair that respect for it which the whole
state and nation are deeply concerned in upholding; but to refuse, under
any circumstances, to confess a change of judgment, would lay the
Parliament open to an imputation at least equally dangerous to that
respect--that of an obstinacy which refuses to confess the possibility
of being mistaken, or to hear reason. It would not be well, therefore,
that the abrogation of a previous vote should become an ordinary
practice; but it would be equally undesirable that any fixed or
unchangeable rule should be interposed to prevent a second discussion of
an important question, with the possibility of its leading to a reversal
of the opinion first expressed.
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