Reading what Gentz wrote in the ten weeks that followed Wagram, we feel
as if we were reading of the twenty days that followed Sadowa. But of
this nobody outside of the empire seems to have known or suspected
anything; and the number of persons in the empire who knew it, or
suspected it, was not large. Even Napoleon, who was on the ground, and
who had the country more at his control than it was at that of Francis
II., seems to have been entirely ignorant of the true state of affairs.
He could have "crumpled up" Austria with ease, and have made half a
dozen kingdoms or grand duchies of the spoils he had seized,--and yet he
talked to General Bubna, and to others of the Austrian negotiators, as
if he considered Austria the greatest nation in Europe, and sure swiftly
to recover from the consequences of the blows he had dealt her. He
actually spoke of the ability she would secure to decide the future fate
of Europe, and therein was a prophet of his own ruin. It is possible
that there may have been some affectation in what he said, but there was
as much sincerity, for there is a great deal in the history of his
career that shows he had a high opinion of Austrian power. When Europe
was settled, after his fall, Austria acquired the right to stand between
England and Russia, as their equal; and down to 1848 she was the
superior of both France and Prussia.
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