The events of 1848-49 did not
essentially lessen her prestige, and she had a commanding place during
the Russian war. Even her defeats in the Italian war did not lead to any
serious loss of consideration, and against them was set the striking
fact that the victorious French had halted before the Quadrilateral, and
actually had begged for peace from the vanquished.
We know how deceptive were all appearances in regard to Austrian
strength; but it was in the power of Austrian statesmen to convert what
was simply apparent into a solid reality. Had they been wise men, they
would, during the long peace that followed 1815, have made of Austria a
state as powerful in fact as the world believed her to be. Nothing could
have been easier, as her undeveloped resources ever have been vast; but
they did nothing of the kind, their sole aim being to get over the
present, without any regard for the future. Hermayr says of Thugut, who
was chief Austrian minister in the closing years of the last century,
that "his policy knew neither virtue nor vice, only expedients"; and
these words describe the policy of Metternich completely, and, with
perhaps a little modification, they describe that of all his successors.
So that when the Prussian war came, Austria was in the same state that
she was in 1809,--seemingly very strong, actually very weak; and she
fell in a month, with a great ruin, much to the astonishment of almost
all men.
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