Sec. 70. A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient, or
wise man; defence to his child or friend; relief and support to
the distressed; and gratitude to a benefactor, to such a degree,
that all he has, all he can do, cannot sufficiently pay it: but
all these give no authority, no right to any one, of making laws
over him from whom they are owing. And it is plain, all this is
due not only to the bare title of father; not only because, as
has been said, it is owing to the mother too; but because these
obligations to parents, and the degrees of what is required of
children, may be varied by the different care and kindness,
trouble and expence, which is often employed upon one child more
than another.
Sec. 71. This shews the reason how it comes to pass, that
parents in societies, where they themselves are subjects, retain
a power over their children, and have as much right to their
subjection, as those who are in the state of nature. Which could
not possibly be, if all political power were only paternal, and
that in truth they were one and the same thing: for then, all
paternal power being in the prince, the subject could naturally
have none of it. But these two powers, political and paternal,
are so perfectly distinct and separate; are built upon so
different foundations, and given to so different ends, that every
subject that is a father, has as much a paternal power over his
children, as the prince has over his: and every prince, that has
parents, owes them as much filial duty and obedience, as the
meanest of his subjects do to their's; and can therefore contain
not any part or degree of that kind of dominion, which a prince
or magistrate has over his subject.
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