So the thing be
understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
Sec. 147. These two powers, executive and federative,
though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one
comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society
within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other the
management of the security and interest of the public without,
with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet
they are always almost united. And though this federative power
in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the
common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by
antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and so
must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those,
whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good: for the
laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct
their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be
done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their
actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left
in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power
committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for
the advantage of the common-wealth.
Sec. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative
power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet
they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in
the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the
force of the society for their exercise, it is almost
impracticable to place the force of the common-wealth in
distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and
federative power should be placed in persons, that might act
separately, whereby the force of the public would be under
different commands: which would be apt some time or other to
cause disorder and ruin.
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