If men were so void of reason, and brutish, as to enter
into society upon such terms, prerogative might indeed be, what
some men would have it, an arbitrary power to do things hurtful
to the people.
Sec. 164. But since a rational creature cannot be supposed,
when free, to put himself into subjection to another, for his own
harm; (though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not
perhaps think it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds
to his power in all things) prerogative can be nothing but the
people's permitting their rulers to do several things, of their
own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too
against the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and
their acquiescing in it when so done: for as a good prince, who
is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful of the
good of his people, cannot have too much prerogative, that is,
power to do good; so a weak and ill prince, who would claim that
power which his predecessors exercised without the direction of
the law, as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his
office, which he may exercise at his pleasure, to make or promote
an interest distinct from that of the public, gives the people an
occasion to claim their right, and limit that power, which,
whilst it was exercised for their good, they were content should
be tacitly allowed.
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