216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the
prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without
the consent, and contrary to the common interest of the people,
there also the legislative is altered: for, if others than those
whom the society hath authorized thereunto, do chuse, or in
another way than what the society hath prescribed, those chosen
are not the legislative appointed by the people.
Sec. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into
the subjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by
the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and so
a dissolution of the government: for the end why people entered
into society being to be preserved one intire, free, independent
society, to be governed by its own laws; this is lost, whenever
they are given up into the power of another.
Sec. 218. Why, in such a constitution as this, the
dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to
the prince, is evident; because he, having the force, treasure
and offices of the state to employ, and often persuading himself,
or being flattered by others, that as supreme magistrate he is
uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great
advances toward such changes, under pretence of lawful authority,
and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers, as
factious, seditious, and enemies to the government: whereas no
other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by
themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without
open and visible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of,
which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different
from foreign conquest.
Pages:
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187